The metamorphose of social partnership: Industrial relations in the era of finance by Paulssen, Jo
LEIDEN UNIVERSITY 
FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 
INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
 
THE METAMORPHOSE OF SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP: INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN 
THE ERA OF FINANCE 
 
MASTER THESIS  
JO  PAULSSEN 
 
FIRST READER: 
DR. ADAM WILLIAM CHALMERS 
(LEIDEN UNIVERSITY) 
SECOND READER: 
DR. J.P. VOLLAARD 
(LEIDEN UNIVERSITY) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEIDEN,  JUNE 30, 2015  
2 
 
Table of Contents 
Abbreviations  3 
List of Figures and Tables   4 
1.Introduction  5 
                                               1.1 The Concept of Shareholder Practices 7 
2. Theories 8 
 2.1 The Corporatist Compromise  9 
 2.2 Economic Rents and Product Market Competition 10 
 2.3 Trade Unionization 11 
 2.4 Competitive Corporatism 12 
3. Research Design 14 
 3.1 Shareholder Practices 15 
 3.2.Testing The First Hypothesis: Cooperation and   
      Economic Rents 
18 
 3.3 Testing The Second Hypothesis: Trade  
       Unionization 
19 
 3.4 Testing The Third Hypothesis 20 
 3.5  Control Variables 20 
4. Descriptive Statistics 22 
5. Analysis  22 
                    5.1 Presentation of the Main Findings 25 
                    5.2 Explaining Cooperation 28 
 5.2.1 The Key Component: Disclosure of Information 28 
 5.2.2 Summary  29 
 5.2.3 Limitations 31 
6. Conclusion and Outlook 36 
7. Bibliography 37 
            
      
 
 
 
 
3 
 
                         
                        ABBREVIATIONS 
ESOP -Employee Share Ownership Plan 
GCR -Global Competitiveness Report 
ITUC -International Trade Union Confederation 
GDP -Gross Domestic Product 
NCEO -National Center for Employment 
NED -Non Executive Director 
OECD -Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PMC -Product Market Competition 
PMR  -Product Market Regulation 
VIF -Variance Inflator Index 
WB -World Bank 
 
COUNTRY AND CONTINENT ABBREVIATIONS 
AU -Austria IT -Italy 
AUS -Australia JP -Japan 
BRA -Brazil KOR -Korea 
BU -Bulgaria LUX -Luxemburg 
CAN -Canada LTU -Lithuania 
CHN -China LVA -Latvia 
CYP -Cyprus MEX -Mexico 
EAST-EU -East-Europe NL -Netherlands 
ESP -Spain NZL -New Zealand 
EU -Europe POL -Poland 
GBR -Great Britain RO -Romania 
GRC -Greece RUS -Russia 
HU -Hungary SVN -Slovenia 
IDN -Indonesia ST-AM -South-America 
IND -India US -United States 
ISR -Israel ZAF -South Africa 
 
4 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure 1:  Product Market Competition 10 
Figure 2: Growth of Employee Shareholding, 2002-2012 13 
Figure 3: Schedule of the Three Components  17 
Figure 4:  Doing Business Index Investor Protection, 2004-2013 24 
Figure 5:  Distribution of Assets by Type of Households 32 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 22 
Table 2: Explaining Shareholder Practices 27 
Table 3 Explaining Disclosure of Information 33 
Table 4: Explaining Director's Liability 34 
Table 5: Explaining Ease of Suing in Court 35 
 
 
 
  
5 
 
1. Introduction 
Corporate governance describes the structures, processes, and institutions within and around 
organizations that allocate power and resource control (Davis 2005:143). At the  center of 
corporate governance stands the public corporation as an essential component of the 
contemporary financial world, where capital exchange tops $ 1.5 trillion per day, and new 
financial products are spread by a wide variety of global agents (Davis 2005; Engelen 2010). 
In this context of the globalization of finance, corporate governance arrangements and 
practices have increasingly attracted the  attention  of scholars as well as investors, not the 
least because repeated crises and scandals such as Enron and WorldCom have cast doubt over 
the efficiency of the existing corporate governance systems and arrangements worldwide 
(Wright et al. 2013:2). Seeing it as their task to remedy the repeated turbulences, the 
international organizations the European Union and the World Bank have actively pushed the 
diffusion of the set of shareholder practices. As European Union's Commissioner Mc Creevy 
explained: "the practices will make a big difference to investor protection, investor confidence 
and the functioning of the European capital markets" (European Union's press release, 2004). 
The shareholder practices are increasingly seen as a means to enhance transparency between 
companies and the private equity investors and to simplify cross-border operations  (Aiguilera 
et al. 2009).           
 In a world in which capital markets become increasingly mobile, investors consider 
the quality of corporate governance of the firm before making investment decisions (La Porta 
et al. 2000). Consequently, corporate governance plays a crucial role in determining where, in 
what form and at which costs capital is provided by investors (De Jong et al. 2005). The set of 
shareholder practices have been promoted with the aim to protect the position of shareholders, 
who consider these practices as a manifestation of greater security of their property rights (La 
Porta et al. 2000: 4).  
A number of scholars of the economic perspective have argued that convergence on a unique 
corporate governance model centered on shareholder practices would be the inevitable path 
for all firms (Gomez and Korine 2008; Edwards 2004; Hansmann and Kraakman 2004; Lele 
and Siems 2007; Wojcik 2006). Yet, despite pressures from international capital markets and 
the insistence of international institutions, empirical evidence shows that there is no common 
pattern of adoption of shareholder practices worldwide; rather, national systems of corporate 
governance continue to exhibit important differences (Aguilera et al. 2013).Despite 
considerable scholarly attention, to date no convincing  argument could reveal the factors at 
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the origin of the diversity. This thesis aims to address the question why in some countries 
firms tend to adopt shareholders practices while in other countries firms remain attached to 
their traditional model: what factors explain the differences in the adoption of shareholder 
practices in countries worldwide?  
The question is often examined from the institutional approach (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hall 
and Gingeritch 2004; Roe 2003). The institutional approach takes for granted a path-
dependent explanation, at the expense of a potentially intentional process, where political 
actors play the dominant role. This thesis argues that the determining factor explaining the 
differences rests in the strength of labor and management's  compromise. A considerable 
number of scholars have argued that globalization and the technological advances have made 
the corporatist compromise obsolete (Baldwin 2003; Blanchflower 2006; Schmitt and 
Mitukievitch 2011).The dynamics of international markets, intensified competition, the 
integration of the domestic product market into the international market, and the spread of 
technological advances would pose a serious threat to the corporatist compromise (Grahl and 
Teague 1997).   
What is missing in these arguments is an adequate assessment that can take into account the 
changing motivations and perspectives on interests of labor and management in the era of 
financialization. For this thesis an unique dataset is constituted, accounting for 188 countries 
worldwide; a longitudinal multilevel regression analysis is conducted. The results carry 
evidence that when economic rents are available, management and labor cooperate to block 
shareholder practices. This result is conform to the standard literature predicting a negative 
attitude to shareholder practices under the condition of economic rents (Barker 2011; 
Gourevitch and Shinn 2005; Hall and Soskice 2001; Pagano and Volpin 2005; Roe 2003).  
However,  this outcome appears to be only half of the story. This thesis' analysis reveals that 
in absence of economic rents, labor and management cooperate to favor shareholder practices. 
By conducting a second more refined analysis, it could be demonstrated that labor and 
management  have constituted a new form of cooperation, characterized by practices of 
information sharing and responsiveness to the concerns of each, shifting away from adversial 
industrial relations.    
In the post-war period, the corporatist compromise has merited ample academic attention 
(Katzenstein 1985; Lijphart 1999; Schmitter 1974), followed by a period where the subject  
fell from favor. In a liberal world characterized by the decline of heavy industry, the practice 
7 
 
of corporatist policy-making would have outlived its utility (Gobeyn 1993). This thesis' 
contribution to the academic literature is to provide empirical evidence that the corporatist 
compromise  - in a new form - continues to exercise decisive influence on how practices are 
shaped at the firm level. The findings of  this thesis are extensive and require opening up new 
fields of academic research. An understanding of the new corporatist compromise and its 
relation to corporate governance is also necessary from a practical viewpoint, since the way 
practices at the firm level are structured affects considerable parts of social life, determining 
how wealth is created and  welfare is distributed.   
1.1 The Concept of Shareholder Practices 
Before developing the relevant theories and hypotheses, it is worthwhile considering how 
'shareholder practices' is conceptualized, since it represents the dependent variable under 
examination of this thesis. Shareholder practices finds its origin in Jensen and Meckling's 
(1976) principal agency theory, where the authors aim to address problems emerging from the 
separation between ownership and control of the firm. They theorized that by re-uniting the 
interests of the firm's (shareholder) owners  and those of the manager in the form of  returns 
on the equity shares, managers are incited to perform well and to create wealth in the form of 
share value. Building on Jensen and Meckling's theory, the concept of  the 'shareholder model' 
can be described in two distinct ways, as an ideology and as a set of practices.   
 First, the shareholder model has increasingly been associated with  the ideology of 
'codes  of good governance'. Shareholder ideology  refers to a  discursive construct, employed 
in the language of a  group of predominant economists and business people.  As they argue, 
the era of financialization requires that a new socioeconomic model had to be developed. In 
this sense, the shareholder model functions as a universalistic script, that defines the 
legitimate agenda for local action (Meyer et al.1997: 144). The ideology of the shareholder 
model  was well expressed  in a landmark address at Transparency International, where the 
director of the International Monetary Fund, Michel Camdessus told his audience that:  
"member countries have recognized the vital importance of the set of shareholder value. This 
fundamental approach to corporate governance reflects a now universal consensus that gives 
legitimacy to the program that promotes transparency and ensures the rule of law" 
(Camdessus 1998, address at Transparency International).      
 Second, the shareholder model can be described as a set of best practices regarding the 
actual behavior of the firm (Aguilera et al. 2009). The set of best practices aims first, to 
enhance transparency through disclosure of information of the firm and its management. 
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While disclosure of information is not directly concerned with the quality of accounting 
procedures as these are set by accounting standards boards, disclosure aims to push the 
practice of  information sharing on  transactions between management and the company and 
on managerial remuneration (Martinova and Renneboog 2013:109).Second, the set of 
practices must serve to clarify the rights of shareholders with regard to the director's liability 
in case of transactions that cause harm to the firm. Finally, 'ease of suing in court'  aims to 
clarify the conditions under which shareholders can sue in court in case of undue torts 
(Aguilera et al. 2009: 376). Following Aguilera et al. (2009)  in this thesis 'shareholder 
practices' is defined as a set of practices, rules and institutions aiming at protecting 
shareholders' position and interests, by maximizing the share value of the firm. In order to 
facilitate the analysis, the term 'shareholder practices' will be employed to indicate the 
dependent variable of this thesis.   
2. Theories 
Following the publication of studies emphasizing the differences in corporate governance and 
practices in developing and developed economies (Franks and Mayer 1990; La Porta et al. 
1998), essentially  three groups of theories have sought to explain the pattern of diversity. The 
first group, belonging to the legal school of thought seeks to explain corporate governance in 
terms of the legal and regulatory context of a country, seen as an essential determinant in 
corporate governance practices (La Porta et al. 1997; 1998; Lele and Siems 2004). Corporate 
governance is examined through the analysis of legal changes, or more precisely, to what 
extent regulations are transposed in the national laws. However,  empirical evidence shows 
that a number of countries, e.g. the US and Canada, have adopted shareholder practices in 
absence of any legal regulation (Barker 2010:73).      
 Scholars of  the economic approach conceptualize outcomes of corporate governance 
practices from efficiency considerations of the firm's production; they assert that the natural 
selection of market forces weeds out inferior institutions (Hansmann and Kraakman 2004; 
Traxler 2001).What the implications are of compromises, conflicts and  policies of actors of 
the firm concerning issues of authority, allocation of resources and decision-making processes 
is not examined by these theorists. Finally, the institutionalist school of thought  seeks to 
explain corporate governance outcomes in terms of path-dependency at the expense of a 
potentially intentional process (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). This perspective cannot shed 
light on  how institutions may be changed by actors motivated by perspectives on gains. The 
public corporation as an essential component of the contemporary financialized  world is 
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likely to reflect a playing field where interest group form and policies are enacted. This thesis 
starts form the assumption that the political approach  is most appropriate to shed light on the 
question why in some countries shareholder practices are adopted, while  other countries shirk 
to adopt these practices. It is argued that the adoption of shareholder practices is determined 
to a large degree by policies enacted by labor and management, united in a common 
compromise.  
2.1 The Corporatist Compromise 
That labor and management play an important role in corporate governance outcomes has 
been demonstrated in a large body of academic literature (Jackson 2004; Gourevitch and 
Shinn 2005; Rajan and Zingales 2003; Traxler 2001).The pattern of partnership is perhaps 
best expressed by Pagano and Volpin who argue that labor and management are 'natural allies 
in stabilizing the firm' (Pagano and Volpin 2005:841).      
 An extensive literature on the corporatist compromise emphasizes how labor and 
management were brought together by bargaining to overcome left-right and class divides   
(Gourevitch and Shinn 2005; Katzenstein 1985; Lijphart 1999). For Schmitter (1974) the 
corporatist compromise consists of a form of interest representation distinct from pluralism 
and statism. Lehmbruch (1977, 1979) considers corporatism as a form of policy making in 
which concertation takes a central place. The definition that fully captures the concept of 
corporatism comes undoubtedly from Katzenstein: "an ideology of social partnership at the 
national level; a centralized system of interests groups, and voluntary and informal 
coordination of conflicting objectives through continuous bargaining between the two 
interests groups" (Katzenstein 1985: 32).       
  In the corporate governance literature, the modern manager is referred to as an insider 
of the firm who generally speaking is not the owner of the firm (Roe 2003; Tawney 2008). 
Despite the fact that the manager (often) does not own the firm, he has considerable influence 
due to the control over the firm's assets (Roe 2013), or due to his pivotal role which can be 
accommodated with labor as well as shareholders (Boyer 2005). More particularly, managers 
draw their power from their access to private information, such as  the real amount of profits 
generated by the firm. Managers have a better knowledge than shareholders or analysts of the 
strength and weaknesses of the firm, since they know the routines and synergies that make 
firms profitable. This asymmetry of information can be strategically employed in the 
decision-making process concerning the firm (Boyer 2005:43).     
 It is well-known that labor is likely to ally with management, when the latter  provides  
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stable long-term contracts, with generous wage settlements. Labor's primary concerns are how 
much of the firm's rent is spend on salary, job security and welfare benefits (Gourevitch and 
Shinn 2005:149). 
2.2  Economic Rents and Product Market Competition 
A well-known theme in the corporate governance literature is that economic rents reinforce 
cooperation between management and labor (Barker 2010; Gourevitch and Shinn 2005; Rajan 
and Zingales 2003; Roe 2003). As is argued, economic rents enable the insiders of the firm to 
enjoy higher salaries than would be the case under the condition of a competitive product 
market (Chou et al. 2011). Economic rents play thus a role in determining which actors form 
interest groups and which compromises are made.   
Figure 1. Product Market Competition Index 
 
Note:  The graph shows the different levels of domestic product market competition (PMC) of some 
developed and developing countries. The scale of the indicator is from 0 to 6, from the least to the 
most restrictive degree of competition, a high score indicating that there is few product market 
competition in a country, a low score indicating that there is substantial product market competition. 
For example, the bar plot indicates that the  US, UK and the Netherlands have most  product market 
competition, whereas China, the Russian Federation and South Africa have a restricted market 
competition (Source: OECD Product Market Regulation Index) 
However, economic rents for insiders of the firm are a source of costs for shareholders. The 
reasoning behind this is that since labor and management are entitled to receive  rents, they 
are likely to neglect considerations of efficiency and performance. As Nickell puts it: "it is 
undoubtedly true that there is the potential to have a quiet life in the form of monopoly rents 
for everyone in a firm with market power" (Nickell 1999:12).Competitiveness of product 
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markets exercises a form of discipline over management and labor similar to that provided by 
a falling share price and the threat of takeovers. Tough market power forces the manager to 
improve the performance of the firm by setting international standards and by subjecting firm-
level decisions to these transnational standards. In sum, market power is likely to reduce 
economic rents (Nickell 1999).         
 In similar vein,  Lazonick and O'Sullivan (2000) have demonstrated that maximizing 
shareholder value transforms corporate strategies from an orientation of reinvestment in the 
firm favoring insiders, to one of downsizing the firm, favoring outsider shareholders' interest. 
Shareholder reforms, that seek to make the firm more competitive in an international market 
context, threaten to decrease the rents both business and labor receive. Adoption of the 
shareholder practices would imply that managers lose their independence to make decisions 
concerning the firm; for labor that their forces will be downsized. Adoption of shareholder 
practices would also imply that outsider shareholder investors become central participants in 
the decision-making process of the firm, undermining the position of both labor and business. 
When labor and management perceive that they share a common interest in the form of 
receiving rents, they will enact policies to maintain the status quo. The ability of labor and 
management to do so depends on the strength of their compromise. As Olson (2002) has 
demonstrated,  small groups often are more successful in obtaining their preferred goals than 
large groups, since they can easily be organized by continued contact between their members 
(Olson 2002:52, 128). The more the partners cooperate, the more they will be able to push 
their goal. Building on the aforementioned theories the first hypothesis is formulated:  
H1: The more there are economic rents in the domestic product market, and the more  labor 
and management cooperate, the more the adoption of  shareholder practices is resisted.  
2.3 Trade Unionization 
However, the dynamics of international capital markets with increasing levels of competition 
and the spread of technological advances is seen as factors undermining social partners' 
solidarity (Schmitt and Mitukievitch 2011; Lewin 2013; Peccei et al. 2010). Due to the 
integration of the domestic product market into the international market, economic rents may 
erode, which implies that one of labor and managers' primary motivations to align in a 
corporatist compromise is now lacking. As Traxler puts it:" managers more than any other 
group of actors in society are empowered to respond to economic change individually and 
autonomously" (Traxler 2004:43), implying that managers may chose to opt out of the 
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compromise and profit from the opportunities the international markets offer. Shareholder 
practices would advance the interests of management, since these practices not only allow 
easy access to international capital markets,  but also to make the firm more competitive by 
restructuring and cutting costs of labor.        
 The introduction of shareholder practices is generally speaking seen as detrimental to 
the interests of labor (Jensen and Meckling 1979; Lazonick and O'Sullivan 2000; Pendleton 
and Gospel 2013). Shareholder theory holds that owners and shareholders of the firm must 
obtain the highest authority over the firm; few considerations are made concerning labor's 
position and voice (Hansmann and Kraakman 2000). It is therefore reasonable that to argue 
that labor will choose to oppose management's choice in favor of shareholder practices.  
Traxler (2001) quantifies labor's ability to make its voice heard by measuring the density of 
trade unionization in a country. When trade unions succeed in transforming heterogeneous 
interests within their associational domain, they gain the necessary strength to formulate 
unequivocal policy demands for their constituency (Traxler 2001:39). Building on the 
aforementioned theories  the second hypothesis is formulated:  
H2:. The more there is strength of trade unionization in a country, the more labor will enact  
policies to oppose the adoption of shareholder practices. 
2.4 Competitive Corporatism 
A considerable number of scholars have argued that globalization and technological advances 
have made the corporatist compromise obsolete (Baldwin 2003; Blanchflower 2006; Schmitt 
and Mitukievitch 2011; Wallerstein and Golden 2000). For many scholars corporatism has 
outlived its utility, for in a world of liberalized capital markets and welfare state 
retrenchments, the practice of corporatist policy making is bound to disappear (Molina and 
Rhodes 2002).  
However, this viewpoint ignores the fact that labor and managements are susceptible to have 
changed their motivations and perceptions on interests in the new economic era. Since the 
1980s two institutional changes have influenced managements'  motivations: the development 
of new financial instruments and changes in managements' remuneration (Stockhammer 2008: 
215). Boyer suggests that the diffusion of stock options and new financial products have been 
beneficial to managers not the least with regard to their remuneration (Boyer 2005).These 
observations concerning management  find an echo in the financialization literature where 
studies have evidenced that employees increasingly profit from the internationalization of 
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capital markets through benefits from stock options and (pension) funds (Erturk et al.2008).
1
 
The financialization literature has shown that the irreversible spread of coupon ownership has 
made employees themselves deal-driven market intermediaries (Erturk et al. 2008:18).  
 Undoubtedly, shareholding has grown exponentially worldwide. In the space of 30 
years, the number of individuals holding shares in one form or another has grown from 30 
million to 200 millions. In the US, the National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO) 
estimates that in 2010 approximately 36 percent of employees working for companies with 
stocks (thus excluding governmental employees) owned stock or stock options for their 
companies (NCEO, Profile on Employee Ownership, 2015).  
Figure 2.Growth of Employee Shareholding from 2002-2012 in the US, in millions 
 
Note: (Active) participants include workers currently in employment in possession of an employee 
stock ownership plan (ESOP). Source: adaptation from the database of The National Center for 
Employee Ownership (NCEO, 2015). 
                                                             
1 Remarkably, in the financialization literature (Gomez and Korine 2008; Erturk et al. 2008), the term 'labor'  is 
replaced by the term 'employees' ,  suggesting that the workforce referred to consists mainly of white collar 
workers.  
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The changes in motivations and  perceptions of interests are likely to push the partners to 
open up new spheres of bargaining and consensus-seeking (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005; 
Kädtler and Sperling 2008; Rhodes 2001).In similar vein, Rhodes holds that a new form of 
corporatism, 'competitive corporatism', has emerged under the conditions of the new economy 
(Rhodes 2001:167). He predicts that competitive corporatism is likely to resist since it is able 
to unite distributional social policies with policies that aim to enhance productivity (Rhodes: 
2001:179). Rhodes conceptualizes competitive corporatism by establishing three criteria of 
productivity that require each of the social partners: a. to shift away from legislated or rule-
governed market regulations towards negotiated labor market regulation; b. to develop a 
bargaining system that provides employers with the possibility of striking productivity-linked 
deals; c. to shift away from adversial industrial relations towards cooperation and consensus 
(Rhodes 2001:181). The benefits of competitive corporatism are for labor first, that it 
maintains a voice in the political decision-making process of the firm. Second, by remaining 
partner in the collective bargaining process, labor can ensure that distributional policies are 
applied, so that labor can share in economic progress. Finally, by linking its power to 
managements' power, labor establishes itself as an important political actor at the firm level. 
From management's perspective, competitive corporatism is a means to legitimate its control 
over the firm (Gomez and Korine 2008). Second, the new compromise offers the possibility to 
reduce transaction costs of employment regulations and wage settlements (Rhodes 2001). The 
more the partners succeed in aggregating their interests in a compromise, the more they are 
likely to push their favored position (Olson 2002). Building on the aforementioned theories, 
the third hypothesis is formulated:    
H3: The more labor and management change their motivations and perceptions on interests as 
a result of  the changing economic context, and the more labor and management cooperate in 
a competitive corporatist compromise, the more shareholder practices are adopted.   
3. Research Design 
This thesis seeks to explain the differences in the adoption of shareholder practices in 
countries worldwide. It is argued that the compromise between two main actors of the firm, 
labor and management, is the determining factor shaping corporate governance outcomes. 
This section lays out the operationalization of the variables considered for this analysis as 
well as their employment in the hypotheses.       
 Much scholarly work concerning corporate governance models and their adaptation to 
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the new economic era have been published since the 1990s. Academic research on the topic 
mostly focused on a selection of OECD countries. By examining the major studies on the 
subject written by Barker (2011), Gourevitch and Shinn (2005), and Roe (2003), Traxler 
(2001) the problem of small-n sample relative to the explanatory factors becomes apparent. 
This study will not preselect a sample but instead include the whole population of 188 
countries worldwide. Furthermore, the  major part of the aforementioned studies based their 
empirical evidence mostly on case studies, which is valuable in their own right, but impose 
limits on the  question of generalization. This  thesis therefore takes the initiative to address 
the research question from the perspective of  a quantitative large-N design. The time span of 
the analysis, from 2004 to 2013 is chosen because of data availability. The agencies  Deminor 
and Cesifo begun to propose datasets on corporate governance ratings from 2000 on. 
However, a full dataset  allowing for a longitudinal analysis encompassing the worldwide 
population is only available since 2004.    
3.1 Shareholder Practices 
Triggered by the question whether the pressures of the new economic era would lead to 
changes in the national corporate governance systems, a stream of academic studies has 
provided comparative country analyses. A general issue frequently debated in the corporate 
governance  literature is how to measure and to identify the underlying (power) structure of 
the corporate governance and its practices across countries. Since 2000, different indexes  
have been  developed with the aim to offer tools for cross country comparisons. However 
most indexes have limitations.        
 The first limitation of most indexes is that they are static (Aggarwal et al. 2007). 
Practices tend to develop over time, often from bottom up, through the incessant interaction 
between actors of the firm conditioned by internal and external pressures (Beyer and Höpner 
(2003). The second limitation of most indexes is that they only cover a small country sample 
(Lele and Siems 2007; Martinova and Renneboog 2013). The most popular index, La Porta et 
al.'s Minority Shareholder Protection Index (La Porta et al. 2000)  is constituted on the basis 
of the legal approach, measuring corporate governance in terms of a country's existing laws 
and regulations. The index has been increasingly criticized for reasons of validity. Indeed, the 
rules-of-the-books can be identical in two countries, but the quality of enforcement makes that 
practices may differ importantly in reality (Roe 2003:184).    
 For this thesis, the adequate database for the dependent variable is the one that can 
capture how shareholder practices are applied in reality. Therefore, this thesis employs for the 
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operationalization of its dependent variable World Bank's database the Doing Business 
Investor Protection Index, including data from 188 countries from 2004 to 2015. The 
objective of Doing Business is to provide information to investors about a country's corporate 
governance standards and practices (World Bank Doing Business, 2012). The databases are 
constructed on the basis of evaluations from annual surveys. The questionnaire, addressed to 
managers, lawyers and business partners asks respondents to grade a country on three 
components, 'disclosure', 'liability', and 'ease of shareholder suits'. Disclosure measures the 
availability and quality of information on corporate governance; liability evaluates the extent 
to which management of a firm can be held responsible for misconduct; 'ease of shareholder 
suits' aims to clarify the conditions under which shareholders can sue in case of perceived 
undue torts. The variable Minority Investor Protection Index is calculated on the basis of the 
average of the three components. For the main analysis the overall Minority Investor 
Protection Index will be employed, in a second analysis the three components will be 
employed separately.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
Figure 3: Schedule of the Three Components of the Shareholder Protection Index 
 
The Doing Business database is adequate for this thesis since the scores are established on 
evaluations to what extent shareholder regulations are applied in practice. Furthermore, the 
employment of the time series database (from 2004 to 2013) implies that there are 10 
observation points covering 10 year observations. Employing the time series database 
increases the reliability of the evaluations to what extent the shareholder model is applied in 
practice. The database  therefore is likely to represent  actual firm-level behavior. By focusing 
on the practical application, the data can take into account a broad range of factors that 
influence a countries'  willingness and capacity to apply the regulations.     
 The World Bank website mentions that the data for the years 2014 and 2015 are not 
compatible with the previous years of data collections, since another methodology is 
employed. For this reason, the databases of 2014 and 2015 are excluded from the analysis. To 
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avoid any misunderstanding, the database measures shareholder practices aiming at protecting 
minority shareholders, or to which degree the shareholder practices are applied in reality. 
3.2.  Testing The First Hypothesis: Cooperation And Economic Rents 
Testing how cooperation between management and labor under the condition of economic 
rents affects the adoption of shareholder practices, requires two variables. Therefore, an 
interaction term is employed, including two variables: Cooperation*PMC (as will be  
explained below, the variable PMC is used as a proxy for economic rents).   
 A database providing the relevant information about the first variable, cooperation 
between management and labor including all countries, was difficult to obtain. For the 
operationalization of this independent variable, this thesis employs the Global 
Competitiveness Report (GCR) 2012, edited by World Economic Forum's database. The GCR 
uses statistical data collected from World Economic Forum's Annual Executive Opinion 
Survey, from which The Global Competitiveness Index is constructed, which includes 12 
pillars. The data employed for this study are drawn from the pillar Market Efficiency, that 
includes a measure on the degree of cooperation between employers and labor. The data are 
gathered from a question asking  respondents to evaluate on a scale from '1' to '7': "How 
would you characterize labor-employer relations in your country?" ('1'=generally 
confrontational; '7' = generally cooperative).  The terms 'employer' and 'management' have 
slightly different meanings,  the first referring to the person who is responsible for running a 
business organization, the second referring to organization or person labor is working for. 
However, since the terms are quite synonymous, it is assumed that for this variable  
'employer' can be used as a proxy for management.       
 Another possible measurement of cooperation and coalition formation between labor 
and management could have been OECD's Archive Database Strength of Collective 
Bargaining, employed by previous studies (Barker 2010; Edwards 2004; Gourevitch and 
Shinn 2005). However, this database covers only a limited number of countries. A second 
problem is that 'strength of collective bargaining index' can represent different measurements 
in different countries. While in some countries the collective agreement is legally binding, in 
other countries this is not the case. In countries, where agreement is based on the  erga omnes 
rule, it is difficult to measure the precise political involvement and influence  of political 
actors. The GCR's indicator is likely to provide a more adequate proxy of the degree of 
alignment between the labor and management, since it measures their degree of cooperation at 
the firm level. 
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The second variable required to test the first hypothesis is 'economic rents'.  Economic rents 
are difficult to measure. However, as was mentioned, economic rents depend on the degree of 
PMC, that is, the more the PMC is restricted in a country, the more insiders of the firm are 
likely to perceive economic rents. There exists thus a close connection between the two 
variables. This thesis employs PMC as a proxy for economic rents.    
 In most studies examining corporate governance practices, economic openness to trade 
is employed as a proxy of PMC (Engelen 2010; Gourevitch and Shinn 2005;  Hall and 
Soskice 2001; La Porta et al.2000; Pagano and Volpin 2005; Traxler 2001). However, this 
indicator cannot adequately measure a country's PMC, since products in tradable sectors 
count only for 30 percent in domestic markets (Barker 2011:127). Consumers cannot always 
direct their purchases away from the domestic market, e.g. in the energy sector or local 
transport. A second reason why the employment of an economic openness indicator is 
inadequate as a proxy of PMC, is  the size of a country. US openness to markets is extremely 
low, since the US contains within its borders an important internal market, reducing the need 
to trade with other countries. Despite US low degree of openness, the US product market is 
highly competitive.            
 This thesis follows Barker's example and employs OECD's Product Market Regulation 
Index (PMR).The OECD competition index, first published in 1998, covers the non-
manufacturing sectors energy, transport and communication, which account for 60% of 
domestic economic activity (Conway 2006). As a consequence, and most important for this 
thesis, this index can be used as a credible proxy for  economic rents, since these sectors of a 
political economy have traditionally been characterized by natural monopolies. The PMR 
Index is updated and extended to a larger set of non-OECD countries. Datasets are available 
for the years 1998, 2003, 2008 and 2014, from which the 2008 database is chosen. In case of 
missing values, the Economic Freedom of the World  Regulation  Database (2008) is 
employed, since this database has a high level of correlation (0.81)  with the PMR index 
(Gwartney and Lawson 2008) 
3.3 Testing The Second Hypothesis: Trade Unionization 
One of the most commonly employed means for labor to exercise political leverage is 
unionization (Traxler 2001:81).The dominant idea expressed in the literature is that union 
representation would have fallen (Baldwin 2003; Flanagan 2007;  Pencavel 2005). Traxler 
qualifies this idea by arguing that trade unions have consolidated their strength through the 
concentration of labor's broad interests within the principal peak association since 1990s. This 
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development would have as effect to compensate labor's declining force resulting from falling 
membership rates (Traxler 2001:81).To test the second hypothesis, the union density  
Indicator of CIA Fact Book, including 154 countries in its database is employed. A country's 
union density rate is measured as: "the net union membership as a proportion of wage and 
salary earners in employment" (Visser 2011). The database contains information collected 
from 2002 to 2010 from governmental websites and national offices of statistics. There are 
several qualifications to be made with regard to this database. Although the problem of 
missing values is less important than initially was feared (data from 154 countries are 
reported), the database is constructed on the basis of different sources, including national 
offices of statistics, the US State Department and the International Trade Union Confederation 
(ITUC). In case of doubt, the data are compared with Visser's Institutional Characteristics of 
Trade Unions, Wage Setting State Intervention and Social Pacts database (Visser 2011) and 
the database provided by the website of New Unionism (The New Unionism Network).  
3.4 Testing The Third Hypothesis  
Finally, testing the third hypothesis requires assessing how cooperation between management 
and labor impacts on the adoption of shareholder practices under the absence of economic 
rents. For the third hypothesis the variable 'cooperation'  as described in  section 3.2  is 
included  in  the analysis. 
3.5. Control Variables 
In this section, three control variables likely to influence the adoption of the shareholder 
practices are described. The function of the three control variables, included in this  analysis is 
to 'govern'  the size of the impact that the independent variables have on the dependent 
variable (Van Evera 1997).   The first control variable selected for this study is the electoral 
system of a country. A substantial body of scholarly work found that the electoral formula of 
a country influences importantly the adoption of shareholder practices (Gourevitch and Shinn 
2005; Pagano and Volpin 2005). In a country where the proportional electoral system is the 
rule, social and political actors are interdependent of each other; many political actors have 
veto points. As a result, established  practices  of corporate governance are difficult to change,  
over the adoption of shareholder practices (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005). Other scholars found 
a positive correlation between majoritarian institutions and a shareholder practices 
(Gourevitch et al. 2003; Pagano and Volpin 2005).  
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In  order to take into account the influence of electoral institutions, this thesis utilizes Norris' 
classification of electoral systems. Norris' variable allows to capture the differences between 
electoral systems that are relevant for this thesis, since  Norris' classification mainly focuses 
on  the division between majoritarian and proportional systems. The classification is: the 
majoritarian  formula (coded '1') includes first-past-the-posts, second ballot, the bloc vote and 
the alternative vote; the combined or mixed formula (coded '2') is defined as using  both 
majoritarian and proportional ballots; the proportional formula  (coded  '3') includes party lists 
as well as the single transferable vote systems (Norris 2008: 228). Norris' variable includes 
data of 188 countries worldwide, which makes the variable apt  for this thesis.  
A second control variable included in the analysis is government's attitude  towards social-
democratic policies. One of the principles of social democracy is to minimize the risk of 
social conflicts, thereby intervening in policies concerning corporate governance practices, 
with as goal to protect labor (Roe 2003: 37).            
For this thesis,  the index of a country's governmental spending as a percentage of its GDP is 
employed, provided by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal. This index, 
including data for 178 countries is likely to capture adequately the social orientation of a 
country's  government, since it reflects governmental spending for the social needs of the 
community. The index is constituted  by accounting governments' spending on collective 
goods and services for current use, and  governments' spending  of goods and services 
intended to create future collective benefits, such as infrastructure investment or research 
spending (Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal  2015).  
A third control variable likely to affect the adoption of shareholder practices is the size of a 
country. Katzenstein showed that small states tend to develop models of corporatism because 
of their greater exposure to the international market (Katzenstein 1985:4). The small states 
compensate liberal openness by a variety of domestic policies, e.g.  compromises that must 
facilitate social and distributional programs. The smallness of a political economy reinforces 
the interdependence of the  social partners; industrial relations  are susceptible to turn into 
coalitions in the search of economic rents. Such coalitions may impact on the adoption of 
shareholder practices, since these practices are  disadvantageous for insiders of the firm.  
The variable country size is assessed on the basis of the population size of a country. The 
variables  governmental spending as a percentage of its GDP and population size are both log 
transformed, since they represented an important skew. 
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4. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 Below provides descriptive statistics for all indicators used in this analysis 
 Variables N Mean St. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 Shareholder practices (values) 1880 4.94 2.81 1 10 
H1, H3 Cooperation 1860 4.21 0.79 2.10 6.50 
H2 Trade union density 1440 27.38 22.43 0.00 94.00 
H1  Product market competition 1750 2.17 0.63 1.10 3.95 
Control  Governmental spending (log) 1770 3.47 0.33 2.68 4.94 
Control Population size (log) 1880 2.07 2.11 -1.06 8.88 
Control Electoral system 1880 2.06 0.63 1 3 
Indicator Year 1880 5.5 2.87 1 10 
Source: Authors own database 
5. Analysis 
For this thesis, a longitudinal multilevel analysis is conducted. The multilevel method is 
chosen because,  first, it is reasonable to assume that the context of the country,  beyond the 
impact of the independent variables, will have an impact on the dependent variable. Ignoring 
the hierarchical structure of the data would result in underestimated standard errors, since the 
observations are not independent (Finch et al.2014). Second, the multilevel model is chosen  
because the nested structure of the dataset allows to include all observations as time points 
from 2004 to 2013, which method enhances the number of observations. Third, the multilevel 
longitudinal method is able to accommodate the problem of missing values, a problem that 
obviously occurs when the whole population of countries is employed. For these three 
reasons, the longitudinal multilevel regression model is the adequate choice for this analysis.  
Whereas the data were initially collected in a person-level data structure allowing to gather 
repeated measures over time of the 10 Doing Business survey rounds from 2004 to 2013, the 
dataset has been reformatted into a person-period data structure. The reformatting of the 
dataset generates a new data frame with the time-invariant variables cooperation, product 
market competition, trade union density, governmental spending (log), population size (log), 
and  electoral system. The dependent variable  which is a time-variant variable, is created by a 
variable 'values', collecting all observations over time. This variable is recoded and rescaled in 
order to facilitate the analysis and interpretation into the variable 'shareholder practices' as 
described in table 2.  For this analysis, the dedicated time index variable is renamed  as 'Year', 
and recoded as a numeric variable, ranging from '1'  (2004) to '10'( 2013).   
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In addition, in order to create a variable to test the first hypothesis(section 3.2), an interaction 
is generated between the two variables 'cooperation' and 'product market competition' , which 
measures the cooperation between labor and business under the condition of economic rents.  
The two-level longitudinal regression model involving repeated measurements nested within 
countries is summarized as follows:  
 Shareholder Practices = Ƴ00 + Ƴ01 (cooperation)ij + Ƴ 02 (product market competition)ij +     
Ƴ 03 (cooperation*product market competition)ij + Ƴ 04 (trade union density)ij + Ƴ 05 (log 
governmental spending )ij + Ƴ 06 (log population) ij +  Ƴ 07 (electoral system) ij + є ij 
                     ß 0j = b 0 + u 0j 
              ß 1j  = b 1 + u 1j 
The tests for multi-collinearity  between the independent variables show that the factors do 
not have a strong linear relation with one another. The variance inflator factor (VIF) indicates 
that the values are between 1,06 and 2,36, which means that the regression estimates are 
unique.  
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Figure 4. Doing Business Indicator of Investor Protection (2004-2013) 
Note: The lines represent the averages of the 188 countries, grouped per continent, on the scale of 
Doing Business index Investor Protection over the years 2004-2013. Source: Author's adaptation 
Figure 4 represents the evolution over time of adherence to shareholder practices on the basis 
of the Doing Business database. For reasons of representation, the countries are grouped by 
continent, following the World Bank Doing Business classification. As is shown, the OECD 
High Income group of countries obtains the highest scores on the shareholder protection 
index, the African countries obtain the lowest. The graph suggests that the differences 
between the continents are important, which implies that the context counts with regard to the 
outcome variable. Although some changes can be noticed for the Central Asian and East 
European countries, the graph shows that overall there are few changes over time.  
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5.1 Presentation of the Main Models and Findings 
The first important check  consists of analyzing the estimates of variance  provided by the null 
model (table 2). Looking at model 0, the high value of the intra-class correlation coefficient 
(ICC=0.66) indicates  that 66 percent of the variance is due to the country context. This result 
confirms the empirical evidence shown in the line graph (figure 4), where important 
differences in the adoption of shareholder practices were observable. Although only the 
averages between continents  are shown for reasons of representation, these results strongly 
suggest that country context counts.         
 Looking at model 1 (table 2), the results show that the degree of PMC has a significant 
negative effect on shareholder practices, indicating that generally speaking, the availability of 
economic rents has a strong negative impact on the adoption of shareholder practices. This 
result is in line with the theory of Chou et al. (2011). When the interaction between PMC and 
cooperation is introduced (model 2), the results show a significant negative effect (p < .01) on 
shareholder practices. This finding indicates that hypothesis 1 is supported, confirming the 
theories of Barker (2011), Pagano and Volpin (2005) and  Roe (2003).  
In model 3, the factor trade union density is introduced. By looking at the sign, it is deduced 
that trade union density is negatively related to shareholder practices. However, the effect is 
not significant. Hypothesis 2 is not supported; the obtained result contradicts Traxler's  (2001) 
findings, while the result is consistent with Kaarsemaker et al.'s (2010) analysis.   
 The main finding of this study is that in the era of finance cooperation between 
management and labor has a significant positive effect on the adoption of shareholder 
practices. By looking at model 2 through 6, the results  show that the factor cooperation has a 
strong positive impact on shareholder practices, at the significance level of p < .001. The  
finding of this study supports the theories of Molina and Rhodes (2002), Rhodes (2001), Vail 
(2007), Visser and Hemerijck (1997), arguing that under the condition of the new economy 
labor and management have developed a new form of cooperation, enabling  management to  
profit from the enlarged opportunities the international capital markets offer and labor to 
make use of  financial products such as (pension) funds, ESOPs and equity shares. The results  
also confirm Kädtler and Sperling's (2008) study, where it is argued that labor and 
management have opened up new spheres of bargaining enabling them to make a common 
cause.             
 Of the three control variables introduced in the analysis (model 4,5,6) only the 
variable country size has a significant positive effect on shareholder practices (p < .01). 
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Katzenstein's (1985) argument that country size has such an effect is confirmed in this 
analysis. The results indicate that the larger the size of a country, the more there is a tendency 
to adhere to shareholder practices, implying the inverse relation with regard to small 
countries.           
 Taken together, the results of model 6 (table 2) show what is most important. Even 
after the introduction of the three control variables, the significant positive effect of the factor 
cooperation between labor and management indicating a positive attitude towards shareholder 
practices remains in place.  
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Table 2. Explaining  Shareholder Practices 
                                                                                                                 Shareholder Practices 
 Model 0  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Country-year variables        
      Product market competition  -1.013 (0.16)*** 1.533  (0.72)* 2.364  (0.85)** 2.243   (0.84)** 2.292   (0.86)** 1.960   (0.85)* 
       Cooperation*Product market c   -0.561 (0.17)** -0.726 (0.20)*** -0.691 (0.19)*** -0.704  (0.19)*** -0.633  (0.20)** 
       Cooperation   1.589  (0.37)*** 1.882  (0.42)***   1.881 (0.41)*** 1.923    (0.43)***   1.74    (0.42)*** 
       Trade union density    -0.002 (0.01)  -0.001 (0.00)  0.001   (0.01)  0.002   (0.01) 
        Electoral system     -0.215 (0.12) -0.17     (0.12) -0.122   (0.12) 
       Governmental spending (log)      -0.269   (0.35)  0.037   (0.36) 
       Population (log)         0.148  (0.06)* 
Cross-level Interactions        
      Intercept 1.493 1.293 1.216 1.201 1.187 1.194 1.167 
      Country-year-level variance 0.247 0.239 0.235 0.244 0.243 0.242 0.241 
      Country-level variance 0.419 0.427 0.427 0.452 0.456 0.449 0.450 
AIC 3494.477 3222.906 3153.136 2593.617 2592.399 2484.10 2480.012 
No of observations 1880 1750 1730 1350 1350 1300 1300 
No of groups  188  175 173 135 135 130 130 
 Note: The dependent variable is Shareholder Practices. For this analysis, the World Bank's Minority Protection Index is employed. Entries are 
parameter estimates and standard errors(in parentheses) of a multilevel longitudinal regression model. All models include on the first level  
country-year  observations, and on the second level  country (group) level observations. Sign: * <.05, **< .01 , ***<.001.  
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5.2. Explaining Cooperation 
Having established empirical evidence of a significant positive relation between cooperation 
of labor and management and shareholder practices, the interesting question is now to 
discover how labor and management cooperate to bring about their preferred goal. In order to 
examine this relationship more thoroughly, three separate analyses are conducted with as 
dependent variables the three components constituting the shareholder practices index,  a. 
disclosure or the practice of providing regular and appropriate information about the firm; b. 
director's liability, or the extent to which the direction of a firm can be hold responsible for 
misconduct; and c. ease of suing in court, or the component that aims to clarify the conditions 
under which shareholders can sue in case of perceived undue torts.  
5.2.1 The Key Component: Disclosure of Information 
Following the multilevel longitudinal regression method as described in section 5, table 3 
summarizes the effect of the independent variables cooperation, PMC, the interaction between 
cooperation and  PMC,  trade unionization and the three control variables  on  disclosure of 
information. The results show that cooperation has a strong impact on disclosure of 
information (p < .001), a result that is not repeated in the regression models with the 
components director's  liability and ease of suits as outcome variables.   
 The analysis of the second component of the shareholder protection index, director's 
liability  (table 4) shows  that cooperation  has a  significant relation with director's liability in 
model 1 and 2 (p < .05). However, when the other variables are introduced, the relation 
between cooperation and director's liability does not remain in place. Moving on to the third 
component of the shareholder protection index, 'ease of suing in courts', the analysis 
summarized in table 5 reports that cooperation has a  significant positive effect on  the ability 
to sue in court in case of perceived tort (p < . 05). Although the  positive effect of cooperation 
is present in the models 2 through 7, the relation between  cooperation and ease of suing in 
court remains at a low significance level (p < .05). By looking at model 7 (table 5), the 
analysis reveals that the ease of suing in court is significantly related to the electoral system of 
a country. By looking at the sign, it can be deduced that it is more difficult to sue in court (in 
case of undue corporate torts) in a proportional electoral system than in a majoritarian system. 
Taken together, and by comparing the three models, it appears that the relation between 
cooperation and  disclosure of information is stronger than the relation between the two other 
components. The new analysis provides therefore additional insight by singling out disclosure  
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of information as the most important component of the overall shareholder protection index, a 
result that requires to be considered in detail.  
As the analysis suggests, cooperation pushes the practice of information disclosure, or the 
activity by which comprehensive and reliable information about the firm's financial matters as 
well as strategic decisions for the firm are made public (Martinova and Renneboog 2013). By 
providing reliable and standardized information, it can be shown  that the firm's performances 
respond to the expectations of the financial markets, thereby enhancing the price of the firm 
(Gomez and Korine 2008:182).Disclosure brings thus direct benefits to labor and 
management.            
 Yet, disclosure has another backlash effect. Employees' changing perceptions on 
interests and the fact that they are increasingly involved in different forms of shareholding is 
likely to go together with an increasing demand for information. The communication of 
information allows employees to judge management on its decisions and strategies developed 
for the firm. Passing on information to employees has direct consequences for the power 
distribution within the firm. Well-informed employees are able to counterweigh 
managements'  control and  influence effectively the decision-making process (Gomez and 
Korine 2008). Often in position of different types of investment, employees are increasingly 
trained in the economics of business (Gomez and Korine 2008; 183). Could Douglas (1934) 
still assert that workers  do not possess knowledge of the market and their economic worth so 
that they stand at a disadvantage in the bargaining process, today management is no longer the 
sole repository of insider knowledge and as a result has less opportunities to employ the 
asymmetry of information (Boyer 2000).The more the function of management loses 
hierarchical authority, and employees' voice increases, the more there is a possibility of 
cooperative behavior on the basis of a carefully constructed balance, where there is room for 
responsiveness to the concerns of each player. This possible explanation would confirm 
Rhodes' thesis (2001), arguing that labor and management have engaged in competitive 
corporatism, uniting labor's preferences for distributional policies and management's concern 
for performance and productivity.  
5.2.2 Summary. Decline of Trade Unionization,  Rise of Competitive Corporatism 
This thesis aims to answer the question what factors explain the differences in the adoption of 
shareholder practices in countries worldwide. Empirical evidence of this thesis demonstrates 
that under the condition of economic rents, labor and management cooperate to block 
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shareholder practices. This finding confirms a large body of scholarly work (Barker 2011; 
Gourevitch and Shinn 2005; Roe 2003). Furthermore, the analyses reveal that although 
unionization is negatively related to shareholder practices, this factor cannot significantly 
weigh on the outcome variable. This finding is consistent with recent research contending that 
union  recognition did not have any significant effect on changes in practices at the firm level 
(Peccei et al. 2010). As this present analysis suggests, the traditional method of trade 
unionization providing voice for labor has been superseded by an alternative form of  
representation at  the firm level. 
The main finding of this thesis is that the more there is cooperation between labor and 
management in a country, the more it is likely that shareholder practices are favored. This 
result holds true in a economic context with a strong level of PMC. By examining the 
relationship between cooperation and shareholder practices more thoroughly, this study shows 
empirical evidence of the fact that disclosure of information is the key component to 
understand the nature of labor and management's cooperation. In response to the increasing 
pressures of the international markets, labor and management would have opened up new 
spheres of bargaining, seeking consensus on the basis of not only interest aggregation, but 
also responsiveness to mutual their concerns. The reduction of the asymmetry of information 
gap allows to strike a new balance, where there is room for labor's concerns for distributional 
policies as well as management's concerns for productivity.     
 The present analysis is of course only one of the many possible explanations, implying 
that further research is needed. However, this study's additional analyses would confirm 
Rhodes' competitive corporatism thesis (2001), where it is argued that a new form of 
corporatism is emerging. Confirmed is also a recent study on labor-management relations, 
arguing that the concept of bargaining has evolved into interests based negotiations, in which 
the two parties first  identify mutual interests, and next, share information to choose options 
that offer mutual gains for both parties (McKersie et al.2008:68).  
This thesis takes the existing theories a step further by showing that labor and management's  
compromise remains ambitious, since it is able to impact importantly on corporate governance 
outcomes. The  analysis clearly demonstrates that the influence of the corporatist compromise 
-recreated and adapted to the new economic context- has not weakened, contradicting the 
theories of Baldwin (2003); Blanchflower (2006); Schmitt and Mitukievitch (2011); 
Wallerstein and Golden (2000). The potential applications of these new findings are 
extensive; new answers have to be found to a host of new questions. For example, more 
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research is needed to examine how the corporatist compromise as an evolving phenomenon 
can acquire the status of a political actor strong enough to exercise a determining influence on  
corporate governance outcomes  and as such impact on the political economy of a country.      
5.2.3 Limitations 
As was suggested in the aforementioned,  it is likely that the new form of cooperation enables 
labor to maintain itself as an important political actor at the firm level. Jackson (2004) has 
demonstrated in his case study research that paradoxically, the reinforced cooperation 
between management and labor  did not prevent measures of restructuration  and downsizing 
of labor forces with lower qualifications. Apparently, labor's stronger position within the 
firm's boardroom comes at the price of a greater social divide between insider employees with 
a stable job who gain rights, and those with more flexible and precarious jobs who lose a part 
of their social rights (Jackson 2004: 24).  
Undoubtedly, employees have gained substantial  representation rights due to shareholding in 
the form of (pension) funds, ESOPs and equity portfolio's (Gourevitch and Shinn 2005). 
However, only the high income groups are likely to benefit from enhanced representation 
rights (Erturk et al. 2008; Jackson 2004). As figure 5 shows, in the US only those in the upper 
half of the income distribution are able to make savings required to participate in funds and to 
build equity portfolio's.  
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Figure 5. Distribution of Assets by Type for US Households, 2003  
 
Note: Households are divided into quintile by income, where Q1 are the poorest 20 % and Q5 the 
richest 20 %. The figure shows that shareholding and pension contributions mainly concerns the two 
highest income groups. Adapted from Household Economic Studies May 2003, US Census Bureau.
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Table 3.  Explaining   Disclosure of Information 
                                                                                                                Disclosure  of Information 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 Model 7 
Country-year level variables          
      Cooperation  0.635 (0.20)  ** 0.325  (0.22) 2.124 (0.65)** 2.64   (0.79)** 2.969 (0.82)*** 2.468 (0.78)** 2.511  (0.78)** 
      Product market competition   -0.815 (0.29) ** 2.80   (1.27)* 4.10   (1.62)* 4.274  (1.64)* 3.378 (1.56)* 3.557  (1.56)* 
     Cooperation*Product market cpt     -1.159 (0.37)** -1.240 (0.37)** -1.048(0.36) -1.099 (0.36)** 
     Trade union density     -0.002 (0.01) 0.004   (0.01) 0.008  (0.01) 0.008  (0.01) 
     Governmental spending (log)      -1.584  (0.72) -0.806(0.71) -0.856 (0.71) 
     Population size (log)       0.457 (0.11)*** 0.457  (0.11)*** 
     Electoral system        0.251  (0.23) 
Cross-level Interactions          
    Intercept 2.299 2.291 2.188 2.134 2.267 2.255 2.126 2.116 
     Country-year level variance 0.672 0.352 0.355 0.353 0.386 0.389 0.383 0.383 
     Country level variance  0.577 0.598 0.599 0.663 0.673 0.675 0.676 
AIC 4571.997 4535.54 4305.859 4299.61 3517.007 3407.261 3395.075 3395.882 
No of observations 1810 1790 1670 1670 1270 1220 1220 1220 
No of groups 181 179 167 167 127 122 122 122 
Note: The dependent variable is disclosure of information. For this analysis, the component Disclosure of Information of the Minority 
Shareholder Index is employed. Entries are parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) of a longitudinal multilevel regression 
model. All models include on the first level country-year level observations, and on the second level country(group) level observations.          
Sign: * <.05, **< .01 , ***<.001. 
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Table  4. Explaining  Director's Liability  
                                          Director's Liability  
 Model 0 Model 1 Model  2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Country-year level variables          
      Cooperation  0.774 (0.21)*** 0.504  (0.23)* 1.266  (0.71) 1.562  (0.79) 1.547   (0.82) 1.630    (0.83) 1.6       (0.83) 
     Product market competition   -0.693 (0.31)* 0.838  (1.38) 1.5       (1.62) 1.572   (1.64) 1.719    (1.65) 1.6       (1.66) 
     Cooperation*Product market cp    -0.372 (0.31) -0.501  (0.37) -0.490  (0.38) -0.521   (0.38) -0.487  (0.39) 
     Trade union density     -0.016  (0.01) -0.018  (0.01) -0.018   (0.01) -0.017  (0.01) 
     Governmental spending (log)      0.445    (0.72) 0.318    (0.75) 0.350    (0.75) 
     Population size(log)       -0.071   (0.11) -0.086  (0.12) 
     Electoral system        -0.163  (0.24) 
Cross-level Interactions         
     Intercept 2.489 2.383 2.329 2.321 2.267 2.263 2.259 2.256 
     Country-year level variance 0.344 0.334 0.334 0.333 0.328 0.327 0.329 0.328 
    Country level variance 0.538 0.526 0.531 0.531 0.523 0.525 0.525 0.526 
AIC 4429.781 4288.606 4017.576 4018.293 3019.978 2910.612 2912.253 2913.802 
No. of observations 1810 1790 1670 1670 1270 1220 1220 1220 
No of groups 181 179 167 167 127 122 122 122 
Note: The dependent variable is director's liability. For this analysis, the component Director's Liability of the Minority Investor Protection Index 
is employed. Entries are parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses)  of a longitudinal multilevel regression model. All models 
include on the first level country-year level observations, and on the second level country (group) level observations. Sign: * <.05, **< .01, 
***<.001. 
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Table 5. Explaining  Ease of Suing in Court 
                                             Ease of Suing in Court 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Country-year level variables         
      Cooperation  0.777(0.18)*** 0.526   (0.21)* 1.394  (0.63)* 1.795   (0.69) * 1.781  (0.71)* 1.632    (0.72)* 1.559  (0.71)* 
      Product market competition   -0.725 (0.27)** 1.017  (1.22) 1.974   (1.44) 1.948  (1.44) 1.682    (1.44) 1.382  (1.43) 
     Cooperation*Product market cpt    -0.424 (0.29) -0.599  (0.32) -0.587  (0.33) -0.531   (0.33) -0.446  (0.33) 
    Trade union density      0.006   (0.01)  0.011   (0.01)  0.011    (0.01) 0.013   (0.01) 
     Governmental spending (log)      -0.315  (0.63) -0.084    (0.65) -0.002  (0.65) 
     Population size (log)        0.129    (0.10) 0.090   (0.10) 
     Electoral system        -0.418  (0.21)* 
Cross-country Interactions         
   Intercept 2.080 2.077 2.063 2.050 1.996 1.987 1.975 1.943 
   Country-year level variance 0.186 0.183 0.187 0.187 0.199 0.202 0.202 0.201 
   Country- level variance 0.236 0.236 0.243 0.244 0.270 0.276 0.277 0.277 
AIC  1870.471 1827.665 1827.528 1593.16 1576.083 1576.54 1574.607 
No. of observations 1810 1790 1670 1670 1270 `1220 1220 1220 
No. of groups 181 179 167 167 127   122 122 122 
Note: The dependent variable is ease of suing in court. For this analysis, the component Ease of Suing in Court  of the Minority Shareholder 
Index is employed. Entries are parameter estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) of a longitudinal multilevel regression model. All models 
include on the first level country-year level observations, and on the second level country (group) level observations. Sign: * <.05, **< .01 , 
***<.001.
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6. Conclusion and Outlook 
The central question if of this thesis, to explain  differences  in the adoption of shareholder 
practices, has often been examined from the  institutional, economic and legal perspectives.  
This thesis examines the question from the political approach and directs its attention to 
policies enacted by two main players of the firm, labor and management. It is argued that the 
determining factor explaining the different attitudes towards shareholder practices rests in the 
strength of labor and management's corporatist compromise. The results of the multilevel 
regression analysis including 188 countries worldwide carry evidence that when rents are 
available, management and labor cooperate to block shareholder practices. This result is 
conform to the standard literature predicting  a negative attitude to shareholder practices under 
the condition of availability of rents.  The main finding  of this thesis is that this effect is only 
half of the story; in absence of rents labor and management cooperate to favor shareholder 
practices. 
Searching for additional insight for this new finding, a second  analysis is conducted, which 
singles out  disclosure of information as the most crucial component of shareholder practices. 
The strong relation between cooperation and the practice of disclosure suggests that the 
reduction of information asymmetries among management and labor has led to a new balance 
of power. As such, a new form of cooperation would have emerged, enabling labor and 
management to effectively aggregate interests and to gain the necessary political leverage to 
impose their favored choices. In none of the analyses the factor trade unionization  showed to 
have a significant effect on adherence to shareholder practices. As is suggested by this study, 
in  the new economic era employee voice is less expressed through the channel of trade 
unions, but rather through  cooperation with management, characterized by  responsiveness to 
the concerns of each of the two social partners, while avoiding adversial industrial relations. 
By linking power, labor and management  ensure  their  position as main political players at 
the firm level.  The findings of this thesis are concurrent with recent research suggesting that 
in parallel with the changing economic context, new forms of cooperation within the firm 
emerge (Peccei 2010; Rhodes 2001); theories announcing the demise of the corporatist 
compromise (Baldwin 2003; Blanchflower 2006; Wallerstein and Golden 2000) are 
contradicted.  
One of the factors leading to the new corporatist bargain would be the increased levels of 
employee shareholder ownership in different forms, that gives employees new rights to 
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representation and participation in the organization of the firm (Kaarsemaker et al. 2010:315). 
Undoubtedly, employees have gained leverage not only through share ownership plans and 
participation in funds, but also through  enhanced financial literacy (Erturk et al. 2008). Some 
authors go as far as to interpret these developments as the 'democratization of the firm' 
(Gomez and Korine 2008:174). However, while the new developments are susceptible to 
bring benefits for insiders of the firm with regular jobs,  new research is needed to examine 
the position of the growing number of labor forces excluded from the new bargain, e.g.(flex) 
workers employed within service sectors. Their situation may be different from insiders' 
position of the firm, since they face difficulties to align and represent their heterogeneous and 
often conflicting interests.   
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